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THE INSCRUTABLE EVIL DEFENSE AGAINST 
THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL 
James F. Sennett 
In this paper I offer a defense against the inductive argument from evil as 
developed by William Rowe. I argue that a key assumption in Rowe's argu-
ment-that the goods we know of offer us good inductive grounds to make 
certain inferences about the goods there are-is not justified. Particularly, I 
argue that inscrutable evil-evil such that any good it might serve is not open 
to human scrutiny-is not, in and of itself, good reason to believe that there 
is any unjustified evil. I then develop the defense by introducing the notion 
of a relevant inductive sample and arguing that there is good reason to assume 
that the goods we know of are not a relevant inductive sample of the goods 
there are-a fact that compromises any strength Rowe's argument might seem 
to have. 
It is the purpose of this paper to present a defense against the inductive 
argument from evil-the argument that the presence of evil in the world 
inductively supports or makes likely the claim that an omnicompetent God 
does not exist. l I will concentrate on the argument offered by William Rowe, 
though I believe that my defense can be revised so as to meet the objections 
of any other plausible inductive argument. 2 I focus on Rowe because he is 
undoubtedly the dean of contemporary analytic philosophers working in this 
field, and because I see his argument to be the clearest, most easily under-
stood, and most intuitively appealing of those available. 
In calling my position a "defense," I take advantage of the very useful 
distinction between defense and theodicy, made famous by Alvin Plantinga.3 
A theodicy purports to offer reasons for God's allowance of evil, while a 
defense has a much more modest task. It seeks simply "to establish that a 
given formulation of the problem of evil fails to show theism to be inconsis-
tent or improbable."4 A defense against the deductive argument from evil, 
such as the free will defense, only needs to describe possible states of affairs 
that entail that God coexists with evil. These states do not need to be actual 
(indeed, they do not even need to be probable), nor do they need to describe 
what the justification for evil in those states might be. A defense against the 
inductive argument from evil would likewise describe a state of affairs en-
tailing that God and evil coexist. However, such a defense must be more than 
simply possible. It must be likely or probable enough to outweigh the likeli-
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hood involved in the argument.s Still, a defense need not offer an explanation 
for evil. It need only provide a scenario under which God's allowing evil is 
plausible, whatever his justification might be. 
I 
In its most recent form, Rowe's inductive argument from evil considers spe-
cific cases of natural evil (a fawn dying a slow, agonizing death in a naturally 
caused forest fire) and moral evil (the brutal rape and fatal beating of an 
innocent five-year-old girl).6 Calling the first "El" and the second "E2," 
Rowe argues that 
P: No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omnis-
cient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting 
El or E2 
is true and constitutes good reason for inferring 
Q: No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's 
obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting EI or E2.7 
Q, together with the assumption that an omnicompetent God would allow 
only morally justified evil (an assumption I will grant in this paper),8 entails 
that such a God does not exist. 
Notice that the only real difference between P and Q is that the words "we 
know of' appear in the former and not in the latter. Inherent in the inference 
from P to Q is the assumption that what we know about good and evil is good 
reason to draw certain conclusions about the nature of all good and evil, 
including that about which we have no knowledge. Rowe presents a perfectly 
natural justification for this assumption: 
[W]e are justified in making this inference in the same way we are justified 
in making the many inferences we constantly make from the known to the 
unknown. All of us are constantly inferring from the A's we know of to the 
A's we don't know of. If we observe many A's and all of them are B's we are 
justified in believing that the A's we haven't observed are also B's.9 
According to Rowe, the inference from P to Q is as natural, permissible, and 
rational as many others made on a daily basis-for example, the conclusion 
that all pit bulls are vicious, given that many have been found to be vicious. lO 
Rowe admits that this inference is susceptible to defeating information, but 
so are all such inferences. This fact alone certainly does not block the ration-
ality of other inductive generalizations. Hence, in the absence of defeating 
information, P renders Q more likely, more rationally acceptable, than its 
negation. Since Q entails the denial of God's existence, P apparently makes 
the denial of God's existence more rational than its acceptance. 
Consider the notion of inscrutable evil: evil such that human beings are 
unable to discern any divine justification for it-that is, any reason an om-
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nicompetent God might have for allowing it. 11 The genius of Rowe's argument 
can be represented as the charge that 
P*: There is inscrutable evil 
inductively supports 
Q*: There is unjustified evil. 
For sake of simplicity and clarity, I will work with this formulation of the 
argument throughout this paper.12 
II 
Stephen Wykstra points out that Rowe's argument works only if he is justified 
in believing that, were God to exist, the phenomena of inscrutable evil would 
appear to us differently from the way they in fact do.13 But, Wykstra argues, 
there is no justification for such a claim. Wykstra speaks of goods that are 
"beyond our ken"-that is, goods that we cannot recognize or understand as 
goods. Since God can recognize and understand such goods, Wykstra main-
tains that, if theism is true, then it is likely that the goods served by many 
instances of suffering will be just such goods-those beyond our ken. Thus, 
we should expect that many of the instances of suffering we see will not 
appear to us to be justified. Therefore, Rowe's assumption that the existence 
of God would make it likely that many evils would appear to us differently 
than they do (i.e., many evils that do not now appear to us as justified either 
would not occur or would appear to us as justified) is unfounded. 
In response, Rowe finds fault with Wykstra's move from "[God] can grasp 
goods beyond our ken," to "It is likely that the goods in relation to which 
[God] permits many sufferings are beyond our ken." Rowe asserts that this 
move makes sense only if "the goods in question have not occurred, or. .. re-
main quite unknown to us [once they have occurred]." But, Rowe asserts, 
there is little in the assumption of theism that warrants either of these claims. 
The mere assumption that [God] exists gives us no reason whatever to sup-
pose either that the greater goods in virtue of which he permits most suffer-
ings are goods that come into existence far in the future of the sufferings we 
are now aware of or that, once they do obtain, we continue to be ignorant of 
them and their relation to the sufferings.14 
That is, Rowe charges that Wykstra's defense requires that he have reasons 
for 
(1) All inscrutable evil serves goods that are beyond our ken, 
and there is no such reason, even given the existence of God. But Rowe is 
mistaken in thinking that Wykstra must have reasons for (1) in order to make 
a case against the inference of Q* from P*. All that is required is that (1) be 
no less likely than not-that is, that there is not reason sufficient to justify 
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denial of it. Since the existence of God entails that there is no unjustified 
evil, the existence of God plus the existence of inscrutable evil entails (1). 
That is, if God does exist, any inscrutable evil must be due to the fact that 
the goods that justify such evil are goods that we cannot discern as goods. 
There is no reason to assume that such a scenario is either impossible or a 
priori improbable. Therefore, at worst the existence of God simpliciter offers 
no reason to assume (1) to be more or less likely to be true. Hence, evidence 
that God does not exist must consist not only of the presence of inscrutable 
evil, but also of reason to assume that (1) is less likely than not. As long as 
(1) is considered no more likely to be false than true, one does not have a 
case for the denial of theism. 
This line of thought is what I call "The Inscrutable Evil Defense." The key 
premise of my argument is 
(2) If God exists and is omnicompetent, then it is at least no less likely than 
not that all inscrutable evils serve goods beyond our ken. 
(2) is the claim just argued for-that theism is at worst neutral with regards 
to (1). But more can be said on behalf of (2). Specifically, given that there 
is no reason to think that all evil will serve discernible goods, there is no 
reason to deny, and perhaps some reason to assert, that the line of demarcation 
between inscrutable evils and other evils just is the line of demarcation 
between evils serving goods beyond our ken and those serving goods we can 
discern. That is, the reason why these evils are inscrutable is precisely that 
they are the ones serving indiscernible goods. There is no prima facie reason 
to reject this assumption in favor of an atheistic deduction. At the very least, 
such an assumption is no less likely than not. This alone entails (2). 
Now, (2) maintains that God's existence renders (1) at least no less likely 
than not, given God's existence. If it is simply no less likely than not, or only 
more likely to an inductively insignificant degree, then the existence of God 
and (1) together do not inductively support -,P*. On the other hand, if it 
renders (1) more likely than not to an inductively significant degree, then the 
existence of God and (1) together inductively support P*. Hence, (2) entails 
(3) Either the existence of an omnicompetent God and (1) together induc-
tively support P*. or they do not inductively support its denial. 
(3) entails that p* must be accompanied by some reason to assume that (1) 
is less likely than not in order to make a case against theism. Absent such 
reason, p* alone cannot make a case against theism. So, it follows from (3) 
that 
(4) p* alone does not make the existence of God less likely than not. 
Now, Q* entails that God does not exist. Therefore, p* would make Q* more 
likely than not only if p* would make it more likely than not that God does 
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not exist. ls But we see by (4) that p* does no such thing. Therefore, we can 
conclude 
(5) Inscrutable evil is not good evidence for unjustified evil (Le., P* does 
not inductively support Q*). 
Without the assumption that (1) is less likely than not, Rowe's argument does 
not go through. 
III 
In this section I will explore the exact nature of the defect in Rowe's reason-
ing from p* to Q*, which is exploited by the Inscrutable Evil Defense. 
Concerning the analogous inference of All pit bulls are vicious from the 
evidence I have encountered a fair number of pit bulls and they were all 
vicious (alluded to in section I above), Rowe points out that the evidence 
justifying the inference could be defeated by discovering that "all the pit bulls 
I've encountered have been trained for fighting ... [and] there are many pit 
bulls that are not so trained."16 The defeat Rowe alludes to is evidence that 
the sample of pit bulls to which he has been exposed is not a relevant sample 
for the inductive inference he makes. Prior to acquaintance with such evi-
dence, Rowe is prima facie justified in believing that his sample is relevant 
for the inference. But if he encounters the evidence, he loses his justification. 
So, in the absence of defeating evidence, Rowe has no reason to believe 
(6) The pit bulls I have encountered do not constitute a relevant inductive 
sample for the inference in question. 
This lack of reason for (6) (among other things) gives him prima facie justi-
fication for making the inference. 
Likewise, Rowe is prima facie justified in making the inference from p* 
to Q*, in part, because he has no reason to believe 
(7) The goods we know of do not constitute a relevant inductive sample of 
the goods there are, 
which is the analogue to (6) for this inference. The truth of (7) would defeat 
the support of Q* by P*. That is, the conjunction of p* and (7) would not 
inductively support Q*. SO, if one is justified in believing (7), then one is not 
justified in inferring Q* from P*. 
I will now present three arguments that, coupled with the assumption that 
an omnicompetent God exists, each constitute good reason for believing (7). 
As such, these arguments constitute, separately and conjointly, evidence suf-
ficient to defeat the inference from p* to Q* for anyone properly appreciative 
of them. 
First, the existence of an omnicompetent God entails that there is at least 
one super-human intelligence and moral sensitivity in the universe. There-
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fore, there is some being capable of grasping concepts, ideas, or situations 
infinitely above what we are able to grasp. Yet one assuming that (7) is false 
assumes that human moral sensitivities are capable of grasping enough truth 
from the goods they can discern to make very large generalizations about all 
the goods there are. Such an attitude displays a human chauvinism that is 
certainly out of place in a world of super-human moral sensitivities. Given 
omnicompetence, there is reason to believe that (7) is true and to reject the 
inference from p* to Q* as unjustified. 
Second, ludaeo-Christian tradition teaches that humanity is "fallen," and 
that among the consequences of this fallenness is a perverted moral outlook-
one that often mistakes good for evil and evil for good-and one that cannot 
begin to fathom the purposes of God. From such a viewpoint, belief of (7) is 
virtually mandatory. Far from being part of a relevant inductive sample, many 
of the "goods" we know of may not even be goods at all. Our moral sensi-
tivities are not only too limited to justify denial of (7), as in the first argument 
above. They are also "out of tune," and at times deliver unreliable pronounce-
ments. Hence, at least one representative theistic tradition offers good evi-
dence to believe (7). 
One important objection to this argument must be addressed before I go 
on. Rowe argues that no expansion of theism (such as the ludaeo-Christian 
tradition) is any more likely than basic theism (i.e., the belief that an omni-
competent God exists), given the existence of inscrutable evil. l7 Since any 
expanded theism entails basic theism, the former will be at least as improb-
able as the latter, given the existence of inscrutable evil. l8 However, Rowe 
also discusses a response to this claim from Robert Adams, who argues that 
one must simply make a judgment between two hypotheses: (i) that basic 
theism is significantly less probable gi yen inscrutable evil than it is prior to 
such consideration; and (ii) that a given expanded theism is not significantly 
less probable than basic theism. Rowe assumes that the first hypothesis is 
true, and therefore concludes that the second, even if true, does not help the 
theist's case. But, Adams points out, it is not clear that this is the only, or 
even the most rational, course to take. If instead we first assume that (ii) is 
true, then if the expanded theism under consideration succeeds in explaining 
the presence of inscrutable evil, there is little reason to believe that (i) is true, 
or to be worried about it if it is. 
Rowe responds that one pursuing Adams' strategy must 
argue that E [the evidence of inscrutable evil] does not significantly discon-
firm RST [Restricted Standard Theism-i.e., basic theism] by showing that 
there are not implausible hypotheses that, when added to RST, produce a 
result that both accounts for E and is not significantly less probable than is 
RST itself. To pursue this ... way would be to endeavor to give some not 
implausible suggestions concerning [God's] reasons for permitting E. 
Whether the theist can succeed in this task remains to be seen. l9 
226 Faith and Philosophy 
But again Rowe has described the task before the theist too strongly. The 
theist need not provide an expanded theism that gives "suggestions concern-
ing [God's] reasons for permitting E." All she needs to do is provide "not 
implausible" suggestions concerning the relationship between God and the 
world that make it likely that there would be inscrutable evil-regardless of 
the actual purposes God has in permitting it. (Rowe seems to have conflated 
the distinct tasks of theodicy and defense, identified in the introduction to 
this paper.) The version of expanded theism I have employed here-basic 
theism plus the doctrine of the fall-offers a "not implausible" reason to 
assume that there would be inscrutable evil, and therefore accomplishes the 
task at hand.20 
But perhaps the best argument for (7) is one from analogy. The goods my 
ten-year-old daughter knows of are in no way a relevant inductive sample of 
the goods I know of. This fact causes conflict and consternation between us 
at times, and may even drive her to the conclusion that some of my decisions 
and actions, which bring what she discerns as evil into her life, cannot pos-
sibly serve any good purpose-a conviction as inescapable to her mind as is 
Q* to Rowe's mind. This fact is due to my daughter's developmental status, 
which prevents her from perceiving or conceiving the evidence that would 
defeat the support her observations give to her conclusion that I am causing 
her evil for no good purpose. 
Certainly there is at least as much difference between human moral posture 
and that of an omnicompetent God as there is between those of my daughter 
and me. Hence, the evidence of disparity between my daughter's moral per-
spective and mine is good evidence for a similar disparity between mine and 
God's. Since such a disparity defeats the assumption that the goods she knows 
of are a relevant inductive sample of the goods I know of, it also defeats the 
assumption that the goods I know of are a relevant inductive sample of the 
goods God knows of (i.e., of the goods there are). That is, it is good evidence 
for (7). But, of course, if (7) is true, then the argument from p* to Q* is no 
stronger than the argument about pit bulls, given the defeating evidence (that 
is, not strong at all). The sample is not sufficient to support the induction.21 
IV 
I have not argued that no one can justifiably infer Q* from P*. However, my 
argument does have the consequence that anyone justified in making the 
inference is in such a situation purely because of an unappealing sort of 
epistemic ignorance. The defeaters I have introduced are not so obscure or 
esoteric as to be available only to the scholar or the deep thinker. In fact, 
they are quite obvious and natural within the theistic tradition. A minor 
excursion into possible rebuttals that the theistic community could offer to 
Rowe's argument would reveal these and similar retorts. In fact, I maintain 
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that such defeaters are so readily available that most people who would feel 
tempted to make the inference from p* to Q* could uncover them with only 
a minimum of effort. If this is so, such people may be guilty of epistemic 
neglect in not making the minimal effort to uncover them, and therefore 
unjustified in making the inference anyway. After all, the issue at stake 
here-the existence of God-is important enough to call forth at least a 
minimum of inquiry from one who would dare to make an inference to a 
conclusion on the matter. 
So a trilemma faces the one who would ground her atheism in the inference 
from p* to Q*. Either she has reason to believe (7) or she does not. If she 
does, then she is not justified in making the inference. If she does not, then 
there are two possibilities. At best she lacks such reason due to ignorance, 
and therefore is not in the most desirable epistemic situation. She is justified 
in making the inference from p* to Q* only by default, and not because of 
any competence in reasoning. At worst she lacks reason for (7) because of 
epistemic negligence in failing to uncover the relevant defeaters. In this case 
she is unjustified in her failure to believe (7) and unjustified in inferring Q* 
from P*. Either way, the power of Rowe's inductive argument for undergird-
ing atheism has been severely compromised. 22 
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NOTES 
1. The term "omnicompetence" names that property borne by an object just in case it 
is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. 
2. A powerful, though extremely technical, argument is offered by Paul Draper in "Pain 
and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists," Nous 23 (1989), pp. 331-50. I am 
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pp.242f. 
6. Rowe's argument was originally presented in Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction 
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"Ruminations About Evil," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 69-88. 
7. "Evil and Theodicy," pp. 120ff. In "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of 
Atheism," Rowe offers the following argument: 
(i) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
(ii) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
Therefore 
(iii) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 
This argument is deductive. The induction lies in the defense of the first premise. The 
argument from P to Q in the text is an argument for this premise. 
8. For an important attack on this assumption, see William Hasker, "The Necessity of 
Gratuitous Evil," Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992): 23-44. Rowe has responded to Hasker 
in section III of "Ruminations on Evil." 
9. "Evil and Theodicy," pp. 123f. 
10. Ibid., p. 124. 
11. Throughout this paper I will speak of '1ustified" and "unjustified" evil with this 
sense in mind. 
12. This revision actually strengthens Rowe's case. In the original argument, lack of 
known justification for a given evil is taken as evidence that that evil is unjustified. In my 
reformulation, the fact of inscrutable evil in general is taken as evidence that at least some 
of it is unjustified. My revision allows, as Rowe's original formulation does not, that some 
of the inscrutable evil considered is in fact justified. It only suggests that it is more 
reasonable to assume that some inscrutable evil is unjustified than to assume that all of it 
is justified. 
13. "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the 
Evils of 'Appearance,'" International Journalfor Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), pp. 
73-93. 
14. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," p. 238. 
15. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that, if P(AlB)=n and A entails C, then 
P(CIB)~ n. Therefore, since Q* entails God does not exist (-,G), P(Q*/P*) > 112 only if 
P(-,G/P*) > 112. The latter is false, and so, therefore, is the former. 
16. "Evil and Theodicy," p. 124. 
17. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," pp. 239f. 
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18. It is a theorem of the probability calculus that, if A entails B, then P(A/C) ~ PCB/C). 
19. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," p. 240, n. 16. 
20. It is arguable, I suppose, that this version of expanded theism is in fact significantly 
less probable than basic theism. I believe that there are good reasons for denying this 
claim, though I will not broach them here. Suffice it to say that, even if this version of 
expanded theism is significantly less probable than basic theism, the first and third 
arguments I give for (7) are grounded only in basic theism-deriving only from logical 
consequences of omniscience and moral perfection-and therefore do not rely on any such 
expansion. 
21. Rowe has responded in conversation that my daughter may well understand that I 
am unable to bring about the good I seek without allowing the evil in question. But 
omnicompetence precludes us believing this of God, at least in many cases. The point 
here, however, is that the great disparity in the moral perspectives my daughter and I 
possess precludes her from understanding that there is any good being served at all by 
the evil. A fortiori, such a lack of perspective will also preclude her understanding how 
that good could be served without the evil. So also with our moral perspective vis a vis 
God's. If we can discern no good at all that would be served by inscrutable evil, why is 
it surprising that we cannot perceive a good for which such evil is a necessary condition? 
If the gap in moral perspective allows that inscrutable evil may indeed serve some 
indiscernible good, why should it not also allow that it is a necessary condition for this 
good, and hence justified by it? 
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